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RESEARCH & EVALUATION
While it is easy, and almost a national sport, to criticise the traditional model of public
sector employment as being too generous, there is a rationale for its distinctiveness. The
career servicemodel that endured formost of the last century was aligned to the bureaucratic
form of public administration of that time. As public administration was ‘transformed’ into
public sector management through the importing of private sector techniques, so too has




There have been distinctive phases in Australian
public sector employment, from a period of
corruption and patronage, through a period of
bureaucratic employment relations, to the
current ad hoc approach that has trickled out of
managerialist reforms. There are tensions in the
current arrangements: potential role confusion;
lackof coordination; dilution of the career service;
new recruitment processes; reduced tenure; and
the quality of the Senior Executive Service (SES).
Despite the managerialist commitment to per-
formance measurement, there appears to have
been no evaluation of the impact of these
arrangements on the quality of public policy or
monitoring for improvement in public service
performance. Perhaps the pendulum has swung
too far. While the reforms have achieved local
autonomy, this has been at the expense of
coordination or monitoring of common issues
and economies of scale. This may also leave the
way open for a recurrence of the previous
problems of politicisation, inefficiency and even
corruption. There seems to be scope to re-
balance the relationship between central human
resource agencies and line agencies, and to
develop a new career service model to guide
employment relations in the future.
Pre-1900s —A Period of Disorder
TheAustralian public services of the 1800swere
generally characterised as chaotic and
inefficient, abounding with patronage, bribery
and corruption.1 Public revenue was collected
by a number of offices, with little central
coordination or audit. Vacancies were not open
to competition, and remuneration, advancement
and other working conditions depended largely
on the idiosyncrasies of individual departments.
Officers did not have secure employment and
were liable to salary reductions or dismissal
without notice or compensation if they displeased
their political masters (Caiden 1965:33–9;
Curnow 1989:11; Knight 1989:55–65). A public
outcry led to an 1894 Royal Commission into the
NSW service. It identified that service as over-
staffed, overpaid and incompetent, with
favouritism in appointments, and an over-reliance
on seniority that put people in positions they
weren’t suited to. This resulted in the
establishment of aPublic ServiceBoard to control
the service, recruitment throughopen competition
and promotion by merit. Much of the Public
Service Board’s work for the next 90 years was
to defend these 1895principles (Knight 1989:59).
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1900 to 1980s — A Period of Order
In the period from 1900 to the 1980s, Australian
public services were delivered through
bureaucratic public administration. The
bureaucratic form of organisation promised
efficiency and rationality, breaking down
complex objectives and functions into
manageable tasks undertaken by specialists
within a hierarchical structure. This form of
organisation was considered appropriate for the
public sector — its rules guided decision-
making in the absence of a market test, and
permitted equitable, consistent and transparent
responses to the public (Burke 1986:2;
McCallum 1984:58–64). Through memory and
precedent, officials could provide a thread of
consistency throughout government action
(Weber, cited in Davis 1998:22).
A bureaucratic form of employment
relations developed to support the bureaucratic
form of public administration, and to remove
the problems and inefficiency caused by
nepotism and patronage. Until the 1980s, most
Australian public services had a standard career
service model described in many sources2 as
including the following principles:
• recruitment based on merit by open
examination usually straight from school;
• promotion by merit (albeit defined as
seniority);
• position classification rather than personal
rank;
• standardised conditions of employment
administered by an independent authority;
• tenure, to provide an environment where
public servants could give frank and fearless
advice without fear of dismissal or political
interference. This was seen to counter-
balance the political masters’ tendency to
base decisions on short-term gains; and
• a code of rights and protections.
The high reliance on internal promotion ensured
a relatively insulated, single, internal labour
market, with a shared framework of values and
conduct, and a uniform framework of pay and
conditions (Gardner 1993a:137; Ives 1996:215).
While the protections provided by the
bureaucratic form of employment relations were
essential to remove nepotism and patronage,
there were unintended consequences. The
bureaucratic public service was frequently
criticised as cumbersome, inefficient, impersonal,
wasteful, negligent and unresponsive (Burke
1986:2; Caiden 1965; Gardner 1993a:137;
McCallum 1984:61). Promotion based on
seniority rather than ability had made it secure
for the mediocre (Caiden 1939, in Stanton
1978:6). The rights and protections that were
intended to prevent dismissal on political
grounds had resulted in public servants rarely
being removed for poor performance either
(McCallum 1984:23). Some argued that the
career service was too powerful due to built-up
expertise and tenure, overwhelming generalist
ministers (Curnow 1989:16).
While there were clear reasons to review the
effectiveness of public service bureaucracies, it
should be remembered that they arose from the
need to achieve complex tasks in a rational way.
They were underpinned by the idea that the
whole is worth more than the sum of its parts,
in contrast to market-based philosophy, which
maintains that the whole is worth less than the
sum of its parts (Richards 1990:12).
1980s — A New Order
A New Order of Public Sector Management
The disgruntlement with public sector
bureaucracy, together with economic pressures
and changing philosophies, led to calls for a new
order.While themarket forced the private sector
to be less bureaucratic, the pressure for change
in the public sector came from political leaders
(Richards 1990:13). There was a growing belief
that high levels of government expenditure and
government employment were intrinsically
harmful (Weller 1996:2). Politicians took up
anti-public-servicemonetarist, public choice and
libertarian philosophies and developed an
unfavourable account of public bureaucracy as
being wasteful and inefficient due to the lack of
competition, being a threat to individual freedom
and crowding out the private sector (Pollitt
1990:5–7,40–8).
Rather than simply aiming for better
administration (and conveniently ignoring the
‘business nasties’ of the 1980s), governments
recommended business as a suitable model for
reform (Jackson 1993:1). Competitive markets
were seen as the answer to curbing the provider
power and unresponsiveness of certain public
servants.Managerialist reformswere advocated
in many countries, and everyone struggled to
develop clear objectives, decide on core business,
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cut staff, sell off some parts and make the
remaining parts more efficient by removing
overlap or excessive procedures (Pollitt 1990;
Weller 1996:4). The specific elements of
managerialism, such as setting clear objectives,
measuring performance and granting managers
the ‘right to manage’ are well documented
elsewhere.3 Pollitt (1990:1) describes
managerialism as ‘a set of beliefs and practices,
at the core of which burns the seldom-tested
assumption that better management will prove
an efficient solvent for awide range of economic
and social ills’. Perhaps the reforms’ ideological
focus on who should own or provide services
was as important as questions about doing things
more effectively (Considine 1988:5; Weller
1996:1–4).
Privatisation, corporatisation and
contracting out were introduced to reduce
dependence on traditional bureaucratic
procedures and make the public sector smaller
or more market conscious (Weller 1996:3–4).
The more recent purchaser–provider split
separates policy advice and service delivery,
giving government the option where to buy a
service, and breaking the mould that policy
advice has precedence over efficiency (Weller
1996:5). This may be the prelude to a newwave
of ‘contractualism’ which Davis (1998:2–4)
notes is potentially more far-reaching than
managerialist reforms. Contractualism goes
beyond importing private sector business
practices, to suggest that governments should
set policy direction, and allow all services to be
delivered by the private sector through
competitive contracting. This ‘steering and not
rowing’ approach results in a chain of principals
and agents, with no assumption of public
ownership or public employment, and does not
require large government agencies. Like
managerialism, it is premised on a belief that
the private sector can always do it better.
The Imposition of Private Sector Approaches
There is perhaps inevitable tension and role
confusion arising from imposing private sector
approaches on a public sector environment.
While there are some similarities between the
public and private sectors, the differences are
perhaps more important (McCallum 1984:18).
The ‘players’ aredifferent—theprivate sector
has no counterpart for the elected representative,
nor a permanent opposition seeking to discredit
them in the media (Pollitt 1990:119–20).
The objectives are different. Despite other
objectives, the private sector would not survive
without profit (McCallum 1984:19). The public
sector tends to have multiple and conflicting
goals, stemming from political and emotional
rather than economic logic (Pollitt 1990:120–
2). The rational appeal of specifying objectives
can have little political appeal if it more clearly
identifies which groups are to be satisfied and
which are not. Narrowly specified objectives
may ignore or downplay important public sector
values such as fairness, redistribution and
participation, andmeasure staff performance on
a similarly limited basis (Considine 1988:14;
Pollitt 1990:2, 112).
The consistency required in decision-
making can be different.While the private sector
is admired for applying concessions or
competitive discounts, the public sector is
expected to apply rules or entitlements in a
consistent and equitable way. Public servants
applying special concessions may be guilty of
corruption, and there can be extensive
documentation requirements to explain any
divergence, avoid precedents, and withstand
scrutiny through freedom of information or
administrative review (McCallum 1984:10, 25).
The public sector has a more complex
relationship with ‘users’ who are never just
customers but also citizens and voters. In the
private sector, a market shortfall provides an
opportunity to produce more and thereby
increase revenue/profit. However, in the public
sector, an increase in activity may actually
increase costs, decisions may be about rationing
rather than satisfying demand, and customer
satisfaction can be an inadequate measure for
some services (such as taxation, policing or child
custody). Reducing the community to the status
of customers makes it difficult to justify
increased public involvement, or for program
evaluations to address questions of redistribution
or equity outside of the current users of a service
(Considine 1988:12–13; Pollitt 1990:124–9).
The public sector has a different approach
to decision-making, with government decisions
being as much political as administrative
(McCallum 1984:24). The timing, nature and
incidence of programswill be tailored to benefit
current or potential supporters of government,
rather than consideration of efficiency. Pollitt
(1990:11–21) rejects the belief that there is a
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distinct sphere of administration where politics
is an improper intrusionwhich can be eradicated
by better management.
There are vastly different accountabilities in
each sector. As long as parliamentary opponents
are more concerned with the 2 percent of
mistakes than the 98 percent of successes,
political advantage will continue to take
precedence over managerial efficiency, and
public servants will remain accountable for both
inputs and outcomes. This can constrain
economical swift action by public servants
(McCallum 1984:20; Weller 1996:4–7).
Davis (1998:26–7) notes that by defining the
public service as different, public service acts
impose costs not felt elsewhere in the market
place. If it is acknowledged that the public
service environment is different, it follows that
public sector employment strategy should also
be different.
A New Order of Public Sector Employment
Relations?
Managerialist philosophies necessitated changes
to the traditional model of public sector
employment relations. Public services were
restructured to remove those characteristicsmost
closely associatedwith the discreditedWeberian
model and to becomemore like the private sector
(O’Neill and Hughes 1998:30). More flexible
and fluid forms of organisations were sought,
in which managers were the key to success.
However, rather than introduce an integrated
new model, managerialism just chipped away
at the career service model in ad hocways. As a
result, the current model of public sector
employment relations is an uncomfortable and
not necessarily stable hybrid of the old and new
approaches (Gardner 1993b:viii; O’Neill and
Hughes 1998:30). The reforms have had an
impact onmost of the procedural and substantive
aspects of public sector employment, and the
major implications and tensions of the ‘new
order’ of employment relations will be reviewed
in the following sections.
A Lack of Central Coordination of Personnel
Issues
Public Service Boards (PSBs) were powerful
agencies with responsibility over all personnel
and organisational management issues. Their
preoccupation with detailed control gave them
a reputation as cumbersome and inefficient. In
line with themanagerialist reforms of the 1980s,
PSBs were abolished and their responsibilities
distributed in two directions. Personnel
operations were devolved to agency level, and
the remaining functions were divided between
a number of central agencies — generally,
industrial relations (IR) and wage fixation were
located in a central IR agency, merit protection
and equity were located in a central HR agency,
and establishment control was often shifted to a
treasury or finance agency (Alford 1993:1–5).
Munro (1989:244) notes that this established
competing sources of advice and influence that
were more overtly subject to political direction.
The Private Sector Human Resource
Management (HRM) Approach
In 1965 Caiden noted that personnel systems
were concernedwith the employment of people,
and not concernedwith the organisation ofwork,
financial procedures or general administration.
The HRM approach is in significant contrast,
focusing on linking corporate objectives to
operational functions, performance, leadership,
effective resourcing, and planning to have the
right people in the right jobs at the right time
(Deane 1998:238; Forster and Browne
1996:247). Davis notes that while people and
dollars had traditionally been administered
separately, organisations now have objectives
and resources, which include people (in Gardner
1993a:138).
Gardner (1993:139) notes that there are two
models of strategicHRM that support devolution
of employment relations. High-commitment
models emphasise the importance of people to
the organisation and concentrate on reinforcing
commitment and productivity. They are
characterised by broad and flexible job
descriptions, payment based on knowledge and
performance, high job security, high investment
in training, loose supervision, higher worker
autonomy, and cooperative workermanagement
relations. Task-focused models emphasise
performance outcomes in line with the
organisation’s strategy, and focus policies and
reward systems to secure and retain only those
staff best equipped to produce the desired
organisational outcomes. This approach does not
favour internal over external recruitment,
implies no general commitment to job security,
and relies on performancemanagement policies
to ensure appropriate productivity. Gardner
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suggests that while there are elements of both
apparent, the high-commitment model may be
supported by the industrial relations agenda,
while the task-focused model is more
compatible with managerialism.
Lack of a Clear Personnel Strategy for a
Career Service
There are a number of key examples of the lack
of a clear personnel strategy or vision, as a result
of the philosophy of devolution and a ‘hands-
off’ role for central agencies.
HR functions were devolved to agencies and
line managers. Agency HR units generally
provide a consultancy service rather than direct
support, and managers must become skilled at
all aspects of attracting, retaining, developing
and performance managing employees (Davis
1998:24). The focus on efficiency tends toward
a task-focused model of HR, and led to many
important functions and values taking on a lower
priority.
The traditional public sector personnel
strategy focused on maintaining an internal
career service, and issues such as consistency
and equity. Devolution of personnel decisions
to agency level, and further down to line
managers, broke down the service-wide
perspective and led to differences in people
management and conditions (JCPA 1992:xii–
xiv; Nethercote 1996:220–1). There was no
longer an efficient manager and formulator of
personnel policies, coordinating conditions and
reaping economies of scale and specialisation
(Spann, in Alford 1993:1). Deane (1998:236,
238) suggests that the contemporary public
sector organisation must be flexible and
integrate its own needs with those of its
employees— rather than a career service, it may
be more appropriate to have a bias toward exit
rather than entry. However, Richards (1990:13)
notes that while universal personnel systems
may not suit a performance-oriented approach,
flexibility is not the same as the absence of a
clear personnel strategy, and the flexible parts
must make an integrated whole.
Agency autonomy came at the same time
and perhaps at the expense of new service-wide
merit and equity reforms (Gardner and Palmer
1992:437). Merit and equity are often only
protected by appeals through a complaints-
based model, and there was significantly more
work to be done to address considerations in
the accumulation and attribution of merit
(Burton 1989:82; Enfield 1989; MacDermott
1994). Central policies developed by ‘hands-off’
central agencies ‘can easily become symbolic
and decay’ — letting managers manage may
bring greater flexibility but there is no guarantee
it will mean adequate implementation of either
equity or efficiency policies (Gardner 1993b:x).
Agencies have also become responsible for
the training and development of their staff. In a
task-focused model of HR, the development of
people takes on a somewhat lower priority
amidst the emphasis on financial performance
(Davis 1998:24). Further, training may have
almost been ‘contracted out’ with themove from
base grade recruitment to external recruitment
at all levels.
In the spirit of agency autonomy,most public
sectors ceased central collection of workforce
data and a lot of time and investigation was
required to gather service-wide information
(JCPA 1992:xiv; Nethercote 1996:225). This is
gradually being remedied. Nethercote
(1996:225) suggests that it was a strategic error
to relinquish control of functions, without the
compensating step of maintaining central
databases to monitor developments. Line
agencies were often either unaware of the need
or unskilled to undertake planning and
monitoring of their workforces (despite the
managerial emphasis on planning and
measuring). Agencies recruited increasing
numbers of temporary and casual employees,
without considering the impact on intellectual
capital, accountability or quality of advice.
Public sector workforces ‘aged’, with a large
fall in the proportion of young people being
recruited, and a large increase in the number of
people approaching or past retirement age (PSC
1995b:3–10). Some public services are
experiencing high turnover of staff, losing the
corporate memory of people who understand
how the public sector works — interestingly,
the private sector is beginning to recognise the
cost of letting accumulated experience walk out
the door after years of downsizing (Davis
1998:28). Such issues need to be monitored at a
service-wide and agency level.
Not surprisingly, less tangible issues such
as morale and organisational climate are often
not monitored centrally or at agency level.
Continued restructuring, rationalisation and
questionable role clarity, together with
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governments continually casting doubt over the
public service efficiency and functions, are
likely to contribute to increasing levels of stress,
and lower morale and motivation (Davis
1998:25; JCPA 1992:xvii; MAB and MIAC
1994:6). The pall of criticism and low public
opinion may become a major problem if
government is unable to recruit a new generation
of public servants. There is evidence that private
sector managers are generally more satisfied
with their jobs, on a range of indicators such as
job security, trust in management, satisfaction
with management style, and promotion
prospects4 (AWIRS 1995; Bozeman and
Straussman 1990:113).
An Inconsistent Approach to Pay
While HRwas decentralised, IR and bargaining
remained largely centralised. This is the norm
in many countries for a range of reasons,
including:maintaining a unified service; fairness
and equity considerations; controlling
substantial labour costs; the political rather than
profit-related nature of pay decisions; and to take
wages out of competition for agencies trying to
recruit similar types of labour (Gardner
1993a:142–3).
Pressures to devolve IR may not be due to
managerial reforms, but rather to IR reforms
which refocus activity from centralised to
enterprise level bargaining structures (Gardner
1993a:140–1). Enterprise bargaining had the
potential to impact significantly on uniformity
and equity of pay and conditions, and put wages
back into competition for agencies (Forward
1993:14; Gardner 1993b:x). However, outcomes
are not a simple matter of managerial choice in
a highly unionised workforce that values
consistency and is conscious of its rights and
collective political power (Bozeman and
Straussman 1990:11; Forster and Browne
1996:261–2). Union power, strong central
agency controls, and the require-ment for
employee support at ballot, have resulted in
agencies being somewhat limited in what could
be achieved through enterprise bargaining — it
has had far less impact than other unilaterally
introduced public sector HR reforms (Colley
1996).
There are difficulties in introducing private
sector techniques and recruitment from the
external labour market but allowing agencies
little or no control over wages issues. This
inevitably causes tensions over levels of
compensation— whether wage rates should be
comparablewith theprivate sector, howtoevaluate
public sector conditions such as job security, and
identifying comparable private sector jobs
(Belman et al. 1996:13). In anopen labourmarket,
failure to meet private sector pay levels through
continued wage restraint is likely to lead to both
turnover due to pay dissatisfaction and a failure
to attract capable people, with inevitable results
for the quality of administration5 (Doehringer et
al. 1996:180–1; Munro 1989:245; Richards
1990:15). However, there is a general belief that
communitieswould not tolerate the public service
matching private sector remuneration levels
(O’Neill and Hughes 1998:35).
There is also a tension in the emphasis on
performance, but the general reluctance to link
pay and performance as the private sector does.
Public services generally pay for the position
rather than the person, and there have been few,
if any, successful experiments with performance
pay. Performance paymay never be appropriate
for the public sector, given the complexity of
objectives and therefore performance measure-
ment, the general failure to confront issues of non-
performance, and the possibility that funding
cuts may result in great performers walking
away empty handed (Coaldrake and Whitton
1996:193; O’Neill and Hughes 1998:33).
The Implications for the Career Service
and the Cornerstones of Merit and
Tenure
The bureaucratic model of public sector
employment relations ‘grew’ a largely internal
labour market, with recruitment largely at base
level. Spann predicted that without PSBs there
would be no ‘impartial defender of the merit
system against politicians and patronage’ (in
Alford 1993:1, 3).
Diluting the Career Service
The career service certainly changed. Control
over creating jobs and recruiting staff was given
toministers and chief executives (Alford 1993:1;
Selby Smith 1993:16). Managerialism eagerly
accessed the IR reforms and streamlined
classification structures (Gardner 1993; Selby
Smith 1993:15–16). Promotion criteria were
changed from seniority to relative merit against
key selection criterion, in order to appoint the
15
© National Council of the Institute of Public Administration, Australia 2001
The Changing Face of Public Sector Employment
most efficient applicant (MAB and MIAC
1994:14–15). All positions were opened up to
external recruitment, although it would have
been possible to limit this to circumstances
where ability and expertise were not present
within the service (Strickland 1989:255–7).
Significant career bottlenecks were caused by
the combination of shorter career paths, fewer
promotional opportunities, increasing external
recruitment and increasing redundancy (MAB
and MIAC 1994:14; Munro 1989:248; Selby
Smith 1993:16).
Nethercote (1996:225) notes that conduct
and ethical codes all assume a lifelong career
with tenure, and that the higher obligations of
official life have suffered with the translation of
government work from service to employment.
The risks of non-ethical decisions, nepotism or
corruption all increase with current practices,
particularly the increasing contracting out of
public services (Corbett 1996:226).
The public sector now competes to attract
and retain employees from a changing external
labour market, and is not necessarily keeping
pace with the private sector. The public sector
retains its focus on defined position descriptions,
while the private sector changes its focus from
the ‘position’ to ‘person’, ‘sculpting’ positions
and careers to attract and retain high-calibre
employees (Butler andWaldroop 1999:145–52;
Richards 1990:21).
The Merit Principle
Themerit principle is a foundation of traditional
public sector recruitment, and was the vehicle
to overcome patronage and inefficiency.
Ironically, the drive for efficiency has now led
to gradual trade-offs for more flexible and
streamlined processes. Devolution of selection
processes has resulted inmerit being considered
at quite low levels in agencies (PSMPC
1997:12–13). Public servants are less insulated
from political pressure now that they are
employed by, and accountable to, their CEO/
minister (Jackson 1993:3). Appeal systems
which protect merit in employment decisions
are expensive and resource intensive, and have
in some cases been traded off in enterprise
bargaining and other arrangements (Forward
1993:13, Thornthwaite 1993:70). Appeal
processes are unavailable to SES, temporary,
casual and contract staffing processes.
Politicisation through Patronage
There are two major types of politicisation:
patronage, where appointment or promotion is
based on party affiliations or sympathies; and
political intimidation, where public servants are
in fear that their future is in jeopardy unless they
say what their political masters want to hear
(Curnow 1989:17; Smith and Corbett 1999:27).
There is a distinction between the necessarily
subordinate status of bureaucracy in action and
its independent professional status in providing
advice and intellectual input (Smith and Corbett
1999:28).Objective advice and analysis of policy
issues is conspicuously absent in a politicised
public service, where agreement with policies
is guaranteed in advance by a politicised selection
process (Smith and Corbett 1999:29; Wass
1989:50). Partisan factors are becoming
increasingly important, as governments show a
preference forworkingwith senior public servants
they have appointed themselves. Morale is not
enhancedby theprospect that senior positionsmay
be unattainable without a commitment to a
political party, due to what happens to political
appointees when governments change (Curnow
1989:18–19; Smith and Corbett 1999:35–40).
The desire to find new kinds of advisory
capacities led to the upgrading of ministerial
offices (Smith and Corbett 1999:34).Ministerial
advisers, who are exempt from merit selection
processes, are now an accepted part of the
machinery of government, to present ministers
with alternative sources of advice. A
Commonwealth study found that ministerial
advisers can become institutionalised, given that
they had assisted with policy development in
opposition and were now assisting with policy
implementation in government. If a separate
ministerial bureaucracy forms, it may take on
the dysfunctions of the public service that they
intended to eliminate (Curnow 1989:17–18).
There remains a question of how elected
ministers can secure the best advice on issues
for which they are accountable. Clark and
Corbett (1999:26) suggest that the continuity
and familiarity with the culture and processes
of the public sector can only be discounted at
substantial cost, and may move us further away
from the traditional Westminster model of
relations between ministers and senior
bureaucrats. Smith and Corbett (1999:40–1)
suggest that while the rules and regulations that
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were intended to insulate the public service from
the capriciousness of political leadership also
thwarted responsiveness, solving the
responsiveness problem can open the door to
patronage and other problems. Simply
introducing political appointees to top
management positions does not solve the
problem of relating management to politics, it
just moves it a level.
Reduced Security of Tenure
Tenure is one of the most fundamental
conventions of the career service concept,
although not a legal right. It was a key element
of employment structures and processes to
provide an environment free from political
interference in which public servants could
provide professional advice for the long-term
national interest — which of course politicians
were free to accept or reject (McCallum 1984:8–
9; McCarry 1994:149–50). However, many
managerial reforms have threatened security of
tenure and effectively shortened the career of
many public servants (Munro 1989:247).
Structural reforms such as downsizing,
privatisation and contracting out have required
different patterns of separation and led to
increasing use of redeployment and
redundancies (Ives 1996:21; Selby Smith
1993:19). Redundancy not only removes the
career path of those who leave, but also has an
impact on the career expectations of those who
remain behind. Waterford (1993:65) notes the
irony that merit is still considered in selection
processes but not in redundancy processes —
in times when there is more redundancy than
recruitment, with the aim of improving
organisational efficiency, you must ask is the
public service getting rid of the right people.
Managerialism eagerly accessed the
‘numerical flexibility’ available through
temporary, casual and contract employment.6
Agencies took control of recruitment and
selection amidst pressure to bemore flexible and
efficient, and they increasingly chose temporary
and casual employees who can be engaged and
disengaged more simply and cheaply than
permanent employees. Atypical employment
leads to a vastly different power relationship,
and there must be temptation if not downright
motivation to protect that precarious job by not
providing controversial advice. This has
potentially severe disadvantages for the quality
of public administration (ACTUQ 1999;
Creighton 1994:57; Gardner and Palmer
1992:438–40; Pittard 1994).
A Senior Executive Service (SES) with
Generalist Skills
The SES concept was introduced as a
compromise between purely political
responsiveness and a purely bureaucratic career
service approach of frank and fearless advice.
It is based on notions thatmanagement functions
are essentially similar across the public sector,
and that the personnel practices of the private
sector are generally appropriate for the public
sector. The SES has beenmet with considerable
scepticism in Australia. The appointment of
people on contract and on the basis of non-
specific skills provides more opportunity for
patronage and cronyism (Coaldrake andWhitton
1996:186–8; Smith and Corbett 1999:43).Many
have challenged this emphasis on management
rather than content skills and whether it is
realistic to apply genericmodels ofmanagement
across a variety of non-standard situations (Codd
1996:185; Pollitt 1990:26; Smith and Corbett
1999:43;Weller 1996:6). Nethercote (1996:227)
suggests that perhaps the emphasis on
management skills at the expense of substance/
content skill has brought a deliberate separation
of power and knowledge in the interests of
shoring up ministerial superiority.
Ironically, the current SES arrangements
introduced under managerialism would be
inappropriate if Australia actively pursues the
new contractualism. Contractualism requires a
return to Weberian notions of long-serving
employees with corporate memory, to ensure the
expertise for policy development and contract
management. Secure employment would be
essential to ensure that they were above political
interference and able to act impartially in
managing and handing out contracts. Well-paid
jobs and attractive career pathswould be essential
to maintain their intellectual capital, to diminish
temptation and to prevent poaching by those
industries that they regulate (Davis 1998:29).
Conclusion
Public sector employment continues to change
in response to changes in public sector
management. In the early years, fragmented and
inefficient services corresponded to the
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fragmented and inefficient (political) nature of
employment. The bureaucratic form of public
administration with its correspondingly
bureaucratic employment relations addressed
the problem of politicisation and inefficiency,
but was criticised as being cumbersome and
unresponsive. While there is little question that
it was appropriate to review the performance of
the public sector, it does not necessarily follow
that the adopted models of managerialism and
potentially contractualism are the best solution.
Notwithstanding this, there was little attempt to
replace the traditional model of public sector
employment relations with a newmodel or clear
personnel strategy.
The result has been an ad hoc collection of
new and traditional personnel practices. The
desire to let managers manage has minimised
central coordination and resulted in
inefficiencies through the removal of economies
of scale and duplication in HR policy
development. The lack of central coordination
of the public service workforce has meant no
strategic over viewingof trends such as the ageing
workforce, the impact of increasing atypical
employment or the hidden costs such as turnover
or the failure to attract good applicants. This is in
contrast to the lack of devolution of IR and
bargaining, which leads to considerable tensions
for a public sector struggling to achieve private
sector benchmarks. There is no consideration of
the impact on society of governments retreating
from their previous role as a good employer and
implementer of social reforms (such as equal pay
for women, equal employment opportunity, etc).
Ironically, in an environment that
emphasises measurement and performance,
there appears to have been little evaluation of
the effects of weakening the traditional career
service. In fact, it is possible that all of the
reforms have still failed to address the
underlying substance of performance problems
of the public service. It is also possible that the
attempt to improve efficiency and responsive-
ness could lead to a recurrence in the problems
of politicisation, inefficiency and even
corruption that arose in earlier times as a result
of employees not having secure well-paid
positions in a service based on values of ethics
and accountability.
There would appear to be two necessary
remedies to the current situation. First, there
should be some revitalisation of central HR
agencies, not to resume their previous
controlling roles, but to provide strategic
guidance as well as those services where
economies of scale make sense. Second, there
should be consideration of the need for a
cohesive high-commitment career servicemodel
rather than the current ad hoc hybrid of private
and public sector techniques. This model should
accept that public and private sector employment
relations should not be interchangeable — vive
la difference!. It should remove some of the
structures or processes that have become an end
in themselves rather than a means to an end, but
enshrine important values and principles such
as tenure and merit which will actually enhance
efficiency and quality of administration.
Notes
1. Similar experiences were reported in the British
and US public service — see Doehringer et al.
(1993), Jackson (1993), Knight (1989), Stanton
(1978).
2. Refer toCaiden (1965);Coaldrake (1992);Gardner
(1993:138); Gardner and Palmer (1992:409);
McCallum (1984:23); McCarry (1994); Stanton
(1978:5); Thornthwaite (1993:68).
3. For example, see Weller (1996), Pollitt (1990),
Considine (1988), Corbett (1996).
4. The Australian Workplace Industrial Relations
Survey 1995 found that:
• 37 percent public and 27 percent private
sector employees felt insecure about their
future in that organisation;
• 51 percent public and 61percent private sector
employees agreed that management does its
best to get on with employees;
• 30 percent public and 41 percent private
sector agreed that management at this
workplace can be trusted;
• 39 percent public and 50 percent private
sector indicated that they were satisfied with
the way they were treated by management;
• 22 percent public and 30 percent private
sector indicated that they were satisfied with
chances to get a more senior job in the
organisation; and
• 59 percent pubic and 66 percent private sector
indicated that they were satisfied with their
job overall.
5. Some of the obstacles to recruitment in the US
public sector include: graduates felt that the
private sector offered better opportunities than the
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federal sector; bureaucratic procedures; pay
compression, which is a major source of
employee dissatisfaction and in surveys ranked
as an important reason for leaving federal
employment. Problems of recruitment and
retention translate directly into lower worker
quality in the federal sector. Several indicators
point to a decline in the quality of federal
employees relative to the private sector (looking
at quit rates in comparison to scholastic aptitude
tests, exit interviews, wage comparisons)
(Doeheringer et al. 1996:180–1).
6. Atypical forms of employment are increasing for
a number of reasons. Wage fixation principles
such as award restructuring and enterprise
bargaining encouraged ‘numerical flexibility’
through atypical forms of work such as casual
employment, contracting out and consultancies.
The costs of permanent employment are forever
increasing, with new on-costs such as payroll tax,
superannuation, workers’ compensation, redund-
ancy payments and training guarantee levies,
while the casual loading of 19 percent has
remained quite static, and contractors have no on-
costs. Difficult economic times make employers
prefer forms employment which allow labour to
be engaged and disengaged more easily and
cheaply than under conventional arrangements
(Creighton 1994:57; Enfield 1989:23; Gardner
and Palmer 438–40; Lee 1994).
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